In the routine politics of local government, economic development carries the greatest financial consequences. Similarly, most urban academics tend to describe and categorize local political regimes according to the way(s) in which they formulate and/ or administer these long-term financial commitments (Stone, 1989; Elkin, 1987). Urban scholars, of both political and economic persuasions, have been persistent in their attempts to understand the basic components of the economic developmental process. However, these scholars have consistently re-discovered a single, simple, truth: that the developmental process favors the dominant institutions of capital and includes, but subordinates, the democratizing influences of the state (Peterson, 1980; Kantor & David, 1988; Bingham & Mier, 1993; Beauregard, 1993).
The problem, as noted by an unsuspecting Floyd Hunter some forty years ago, is that such an arrangement "does not square with the concepts of democracy we have been taught to revere" (Hunter, 1953: 1). This inconsistency, between theory and practice, is significant in that it emerges, by design or default, from within a policy area where local government is generally subject to the good graces of private elites, and where the financial stakes, at least for local government, are greatest.
Such a problem would seem, at some point, to raise questions concerning the financial capacity for urban governance: Does such a capacity exist? If so, can it be adequate, given that private elites control much of the capital needed to finance an economic development strategy? At another point, it raises questions to do with equity: Are the costs and benefits associated with development distributed authentically and fairly? Will the government administer this distribution, or will it be "administered" freely, through market transactions. If urban economic development policies were redesigned to ensure the long-term welfare of its citizens and further distributive justice, would it make more of a (material) difference than, for instance, the Great Society programs?
It is, in this light, an occasion for wonder in most instances, this area of policy has somehow managed to avoid critical evaluation. Indeed, as Robert A. Beauregard observes, whenever one finds fault with the traditional economic development process, he or she risks being viewed as an "opponent of progress" (Beauregard, 1993: 267).
More importantly, while these, and related, issues would seem weighty enough to capture more consideration from urban political scholars, this has not been the case. Instead, the vast majority of them have chosen to be "partners of progress" by attending to the more "administrative" matters.
The central issues of urban development politics have little to do with democracy, and even less to do with governance. Rather, today, as Clarence N. Stone (1989) observes, the central issues turn on "social production." Contemporary urban political scholars are primarily concerned with enhancing the local capacity to "assemble and use needed [public and private] resources for policy initiative[s]" (Stone, 1989: 227). Meanwhile, the larger problems stand unaddressed. At issue is whether the dominant institutions of capital should, within a policy area of such financial consequence to urban America, dominate the developmental process an arrangement which, in its present form, subordinates the interests of the general public to those of landowning elites. So long as this (normative) problem remains unaddressed, the efforts of contemporary urban political scholars are seen more clearly as an attempt to "run a constitution" which has yet to be "framed."
Recognizing the mobility of capital, the fact that political leaders have relatively short terms of office, that cities are tax-dependent (Kantor & David, 1988), and that their powers are severely limited (Peterson, 1981) this article argues that the private dominance of local government poses considerable danger for urban futures, not to mention, the traditional (democratic) processes of public accountabilty and democratic control. Recent proponents of national urban policy have explained how, the notion of democratic governance at local levels is altogether unreasonable (Molotch, 1976; Peterson, 1981; Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989; Swanstrom, 1988; DeLeon, 1992). As such, the notion of a national urban policy seems, at some point, inescapable.
Author: Steven A. Maclin, Ph. D.
About the Author: Dr. Maclin has been a university professor since 1994, but from 1998 - 2004, he lived and worked with American military troops in Japan, Okinawa, and South Korea. He has previously edited and published dozens of articles in professional administrative journals and recently, in his ‘spare time,’ he’s been building websites for distributing materials to his graduate students. Hes now stateside, teaching graduate students online, writing articles and developing a small online business (see
http://buyfromart.com); he can be reached at info@buyfromart.com.