The term "urban regime" refers to the allocation of that which is valued (e.g., material resources, political power, and participation) among a group of persons according to an authoritatively-prescribed pattern of policymaking (Easton, 1965; Di Gaetano, 1989; Kerstein, 1991). These policies are prescribed by "governing coalitions," a term which is often used interchangeably with "urban regimes," although the two should not be confused (Stone, 1987). The term governing coalition refers to an alliance of elite economic and political interests that control local or state government. Within whatever political niche(s) is available at the time, varying combinations of these elites attempt to fashion urban political agendas so as to further their particular interests. In most instances, their mode of policymaking forms coherent patterns over time, though as some indicate, this is not always the case (Easton, 1965: 50; Di Gaetano, 1989). In either case, urban regime theory speaks to the nature of these policymaking patterns and has become popularly characterized by two distinct schools of thought (Di Gaetano, 1989: 262).
One school categorizes these patterns within their "historic context." This school, which was fathered by Stephen Elkin (1987), argues that urban regimes across the United States form fairly uniform policymaking patterns within specific historic "eras" of urban politics (Elkin, 1987; Fainstein et al., 1983). The current propensity to promote stadiums and convention centers, for Charles Euchner (1993), seems to follow one such pattern: with early promises of economic benefits, and later, arguments for the development or preservation of a citys civic image. As an indicator of this pattern, Euchner notes how the economic argument for a Philadelphia convention center was strongly rebutted, even though "there [wa]s considerable momentum to proceed anyway [and] for various reasons, including the belief that it [wa]s too late to turn back, the conviction that the city need[ed] a world-class center to be a world-class city, and an unwillingness to appear to have goofed" (correspondence from Grigsby to Euchner, November 8, 1988; cited in Euchner, 1993: 193). This school presumes urban regimes of certain cities formulate development policy similarly across the United States within a given era. While these similarities are also expected to change in due time, their changes are expected to flow from changes in the nature of urban politics.
The other school of thought categorizes these patterns geographically. It swas popularized by Clarence Stone (1989), who argues much the opposite: that urban regimes create uniform policymaking patterns over time, but that these patterns are less important. That which, for Stone, holds more importance, are those patterns which emerge from a close consideration of policymaking practices among cities, within the same era of urban politics (Judd & Ready, 1986; Stone, 1989).
Interestingly, a basic weakness within each school is remedied by a strength within the other. Where Elkins (1987) historic approach ignores the unique variations in policymaking among cities within a given era, Stones (1989) geographic approach addresses these variations. And, where Stones approach ignores the broader patterns of regime formation over time, Elkins approach takes up the slack. However, neither school is designed as a foil for the other; rather, the fact that their weaknesses are remedied by one another seems to occur more circumstantially (even though Elkin and Stone work in the same academic department), leaving the theoretical literature on urban regimes with three very closely related defects.
1. Narrowly Concerned with Description
The first has to do with the literatures central concern for description, or for explaining how and why urban development policymaking operates as it does. Typically, an analysis flows from an intensive case study and elaborates the intricacies involved in the formulation of a specific policy decision (DeLeon, 1992; Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989). An author will occasionally bemoan the fact that development policymaking is conducted within, and generally serves the interests of, a small elite circle of participants. And, within the authors limited concern for description, one might reasonably question the accuracy of their studies (Hanson, 1993; Longoria, Jr., 1994; Elkins, 1995). And, while their findings may be interesting, they are also likely to be unimportant, owing to the fields limited concern for description. Several authors (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989; DeLeon, 1992; Imbroscio, 1995; Elkins, 1995) have attempted to expand this central concern by bantering about individualized concepts such as accountability, productive efficiency, and distributive equity, as a basis for clarifying problems to do with "systematic bias." Elkin (1987), for instance, uses this term to refer to those instances where popular control in cities is skewed such that some interests (usually elite interests such as those of professional sports franchises, in the present case), are systematically favored over others, such as those of the general public.2 The improprieties that Elkin and other authors identify are well taken, but the individual concepts rarely emerge from a coherent normative (i.e., democratic) frame of reference; as such, they appear incomplete.
This is where some of the more sophisticated writers have taken matters a step further by claiming that their works are designed to determine how development projects match up against some normative standard (Peterson, 1981; Katznelson, 1973). The principal difficulty with their claims is that they still do not go far enough. They do not, in other words, explicate the fact that the policymaking patterns they presume to explain already occur within a highly networked structure, one which for them remains unstated. Importantly, they fail to evoke any sense of indignation at urban decline which, in a representative democracy, often results from the systematic biases they clearly indicate. Further, they fail to analyze the costs of ignoring such biases declining government approval ratings and the long term threats to the legitimacy of the government which stands closest to the people. More importantly, they fail to explain either that these biases need not remain unchallenged, or that when they do they become institutionalized. At which point, they serve to further entrench classes of wealth and centers of power, and in this way to erode, even further, the intended democratic character of our society.2 Instead, the literature on urban regimes almost treats systematic biases neutrally, as an acceptable norm. It is, however, in meeting these indignities with neutrality, that this literature adds to, if not encourages, the apathy with which American society apprehends its own destruction. A fundamental concern for dealing with this political-administrative void leads us to the literatures second basic defect.
2. Obscure, Overly-simplistic Frameworks
This defect has to do with the structural frameworks within which the studied developmental policies are generated; they remain obscure, and are sometimes contradictory. Most of the research is not actually concerned, at least conceptually, with "economic development"; instead, it is primarily concerned with capital growth. Researchers tend to paint an environment dominated by business (Rubin, 1988), wherein development is conducted under a "value free" shroud. Beneath this shroud, impassioned civic boosters use terms such as "urban renaissance" and "world-class status" apparently, to convince the public that "whats good for business is good for the city" and that the only real problem with our community, if there is one, is that of insufficient capital investment: if we could just somehow get government to provide more subsidies for more businesses, then businesses would create more jobs and we would be able to improve local revenues, decrease crime and unemployment and reinvigorate educational systems.
The casual observer might think that if such biases were indeed so obvious, that perhaps they would have been handled by those institutions that have traditionally had a democratizing effect on the formulation of public policy. On the whole, however, this has not been so. Many such institutions have either been dismantled or transformed so that they no longer perform as expected. Indeed, the only group that has remained interested in local government on a sustained basis has been that of business, and for obvious reasons. On the one hand, business relies on public infrastructures, on the other, business seeks to grow if need be, through government contracts, regulatory relief, low-interest loans, political influence and the like.
Mayors and other local officials usually play important though ceremonial roles in development policymaking. Indeed, it has long been recognized that with only the rarest most eccentric exceptions (e.g., Carl Stokes and later, Dennis Kucinich of Cleveland; the late Harold Washington of Chicago; and, the more recent tradition of "equity planners"), these individuals appear more clearly as captives of urban "growth machines" (Molotch, 1976). So, the idea that one of them might stand in strong opposition to the interests of such arrangements is nearly unthinkable. Being astute, elected officials understand this. They understand that they have few powers of their own to stimulate economic growth, that investment capital is mobile, that the citys creditors are deeply interested in whether economic activity is on the upswing and that, if the citys line of credit dries up default and bankruptcy are possible, which would make re-election out of the question. Local businessmen, being equally astute, understand these things as well. There is a strong tendency for elected officials and local businessmen, particularly those with fixed assets, to regard each other as allies (Elkin, 1987; also see Caro, 1975). As a result of this alliance, the developmental enterprise has been able to rely, predictably and significantly, on the political influence of elected officials and on the resources they provide the enterprise through tax abatements, regulatory relief, investment incentives and so on.
Thus, it would appear that local politics is animated by a bond among small groups of policymaking elites, some of whom fit the mold of the intrepid "public entrepreneur" bent on revitalizing or re-inventing government (Lewis, 1980; Neels, 1984; Gabler and Osborne, 1992; Goodsell, 1994; Terry, 1996). Public entrepreneurs are often depicted as the faithful allies of private entrepreneurs, those who control private capital resources. For his or her constituents, the public entrepreneur receives political benefits and praise for providing new jobs. For his or her personal benefit, the private counterpart receives economic rewards, perhaps even a monopoly over a public service that is vital to the local economy. In most instances, these "mutually beneficial" developmental sorties are often explained as rewarding a few at the expense of the many. Newspaper stories of these partnerships are sometimes decorated with pictures of beaming politicos and developers, cutting ribbons and patting each other on the back for their courage and vision. But, while the literature provides research, and the stories sell newspapers, they both misperceive the complexities of the local policymaking system which underscores the literatures third basic defect.
3. Over-emphasis on Individualized Efforts
Policymaking influence, in both instances, is ascribed to individuals as if it were acquired on the basis of individual merit, or on sheer will power having little to do with the highly networked context of the urban development policymaking system (OToole, 1997). The term "structure" is used to refer to the legal mechanisms and institutional norms through which the local policymaking system is either required, or strongly expected, to operate. Absent an understanding of this structure, theorists may remain unable to develop an accurate description of the local policymaking system. More importantly, they will be unable to prescribe how, when, where, or whether public managers might effectively intervene in the policymaking system for the purpose of making appropriate changes. If, on the other hand, the structure of the system were more fully understood, economic development might be perceived less often as the result of individualized efforts and more often as the result of how society has constructed local governments and urban economies, and how this structure has allowed or aided systematic biases in becoming institutionalized. As OToole (1997) elaborates the distinction here is important.
Political leaders and administrators may be less able to correct some of the more wicked problems relating to individualized efforts, as with instances of secret meetings, illegal kickbacks, and so forth. They may, however, be more able to address those problems if they were understood as being more closely related to the structure of local governments and urban economies. Thus, in developing an understanding of urban development policymaking that lends itself to intervention, urban politics and urban economics need to be framed in a way that illuminates the networked structure of urban policymaking in general. Several studies have already generated useful frameworks for understanding this structure and may act as a point of departure.
Author: Steven A. Maclin, Ph. D.
About the Author: Dr. Maclin has been a university professor of public administration and policy since 1994. Recently, from 1998 - 2004, he lived and worked with American military troops in Japan, Okinawa, and South Korea. He has previously edited and published dozens of articles in professional administrative journals and recently, in his ‘spare time,’ he’s been building websites for distributing materials to his graduate students. Hes now stateside, teaching graduate students online, writing articles and developing a small online business (see
http://buyfromart.com); he can be reached at info@buyfromart.com.